India and China at Sea: Competition for Naval Dominance in the Indian Ocean by Rielage, Dale C. & Brewster, David
Naval War College Review 
Volume 73 
Number 3 Summer 2020 Article 16 
2020 
India and China at Sea: Competition for Naval Dominance in the 
Indian Ocean 
Dale C. Rielage 
David Brewster 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review 
Recommended Citation 
Rielage, Dale C. and Brewster, David (2020) "India and China at Sea: Competition for Naval Dominance in 
the Indian Ocean," Naval War College Review: Vol. 73 : No. 3 , Article 16. 
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss3/16 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval 
War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu. 
 1 5 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
submarine as the major elements of that 
nation’s independent nuclear deterrent. 
Although he glosses over it, he was 
one of the few to make the transition 
successfully into higher-level nuclear 
management, which took him right 
to the pinnacle of his specialization. 
He therefore can offer his readers an 
almost unique perspective into the 
world of nuclear engineering, from the 
deckplates right through to higher-level 
policy making. Paradoxically, though, 
his illustrious career almost was cut off 
at the knees when his earnest, and in 
some ways naive, early efforts attracted 
some unwarranted judgment from 
colleagues with a less-than-nurturing 
disposition. How many others of us 
suffered similar, “there but for the 
grace of God” moments like these?
Endowed with a wry sense of humor 
and a literary bent, Thompson paints at 
times a disquieting picture of the darker, 
human side of life in submarines. His 
characters are portrayed vividly, and 
anyone who has served will recognize 
their types instantly. Some may take 
exception with what, at times, seems 
a lengthy preoccupation with his own 
youthful insecurities, so the book will 
not be everyone’s cup of tea, focusing as 
it does on the author’s personal experi-
ences and observations as opposed to 
the larger policy issues of the day. That 
said, the book does in passing provide 
some useful insights into the develop-
ment of the Tigerfish wire-guided tor-
pedo and the administration of nuclear 
safety directives at the higher command 
level. There are also memorable, lighter 
moments, such as the vivid description 
of “corporate constipation,” caused by 
the failure of the sewage treatment plant, 
as well as the many mishaps that inevi-
tably befall mariners who essentially 
are deprived of their senses with regard 
to their immediate surroundings.
In sum, this is a book for those 
interested in knowing what it was 
like to live in submarines during the 
Cold War. Those seeking coverage of 
matters of policy and strategy probably 
will be better served elsewhere.
ANGUS ROSS
India and China at Sea: Competition for Naval 
Dominance in the Indian Ocean, ed. David Brew-
ster. New Delhi: Oxford Univ. Press, 2018. 348 
pages. $40.99.
Americans often think of the vast 
Indian Ocean as the “rear area” of the 
Pacific Ocean—a featureless expanse 
notable mainly for the goods, services, 
and military forces that traverse it. The 
view from New Delhi and Beijing is 
profoundly different. Beijing recognizes 
that the flow of energy, raw materials, 
and finished goods across the Indian 
Ocean is essential to China’s economic 
success. Chairman Xi Jinping’s One Belt, 
One Road (OBOR) initiative is, in part, 
a strategic investment in securing these 
sea lines of communication. In just over 
a decade, the People’s Liberation Army 
Navy (PLAN) has gone from being an 
occasional visitor to the Indian Ocean 
to a constantly deployed presence, 
supported by its first formal overseas 
base, at Djibouti. The Indian Ocean will 
become, as one Chinese scholar writes, 
“a normal region for the PLAN’s combat 
reach in the future” (p. 94). India, 
traditionally the dominant regional 
power, views these developments with 
concern, even as it considers its own 
interests in the traditionally Chinese-
dominated areas of the western Pacific.
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In response, David Brewster, a specialist 
in Indo-Pacific maritime security at 
the Australian National University, 
has assembled Indian, Australian, 
Chinese, and American experts to 
consider the maritime trajectory of 
the region. Indian scholars make up 
the majority of the contributors, while 
the Australian authors offer views 
influenced by the unique position of 
their nation: politically close to the 
United States, economically tied to 
China, and physically at the crossroads 
between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
As the subtitle suggests, competition 
is an assumed reality throughout the 
thirteen collected essays. Through 
the diverse views in this volume, the 
complexity underlying this competition 
emerges—and with it a discussion of 
why both India and China struggle to 
understand, much less assuage, each 
other’s suspicions. On the Indian side, 
intellectual understanding of China’s 
genuine interests in the region collides 
with an “Indian Monroe Doctrine” 
dating to the administration of Jawahar-
lal Nehru, India’s first prime minster. 
Unclear and inconsistently articulated, 
it remains an idea that, if “not actually a 
policy . . . is at least a preferred objec-
tive” of Indian policy makers (p. 20). 
The Indian view of Chinese maritime 
activity also is influenced by ongoing 
conflict with China over land borders 
and a perception that China has worked 
to minimize India’s rightful role in 
multiple international organizations.
Meanwhile, contributions from Indian, 
American, and Australian scholars are 
particularly harsh in describing China’s 
failure to consider the suspicion and 
resistance that Chinese maritime expan-
sion has produced. India scholar Pramit 
Pal Chaudhuri quotes former Indian 
national security advisor Shivshankar 
Menon’s characterization of China as 
an “autistic superpower”—unable, by 
its very nature, to understand India’s 
concerns (p. 61). American John Garver 
asserts that a constructed narrative of 
national exceptionalism and peaceful 
Ming dynasty voyages of discovery limits 
China’s ability to understand India’s 
apprehensions about China’s rise as a 
naval power. Australian Rory Medcalf 
describes official and unofficial Chinese 
explanations of its Indian Ocean pres-
ence as being so conspicuously inconsis-
tent with regional perceptions that they 
themselves contribute to suspicions.
Calling India “oversensitive,” Yunnan 
University economics professor Zhu 
Li offers a case study in that narrative. 
Asserting that OBOR is an international, 
rather than a Chinese-led, initiative, 
he outlines the essential choice being 
offered to India—since it cannot stop 
the OBOR initiative, it should partner 
with China and claim a slice of the 
economic benefits. You Ji from the 
University of Macau, in contrast, offers 
a blunt vision of the Chinese military 
role in the Indian Ocean. Noting that 
the 2015 revision to China’s National 
Defense Strategy calls for “projecting 
battles far away from China’s homeland,” 
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is 
working to extend its “war fighting into 
the global commons” (pp. 91–92). In this 
context, he asserts that “the PLA’s land 
reclamation in the Spratlys was meant 
to . . . establish forward deployment en 
route to the Indian Ocean” (p. 96).
Nonetheless, Darshana Baruah describes 
India’s evolving maritime domain aware-
ness strategy as a response to issues 
beyond just China. Terrorism and the 
proliferation of advanced naval capa-
bilities in the region have pushed India 
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toward new partnerships, especially with 
Southeast Asia and Japan. While promis-
ing, they face the significant challenge of 
what Baruah diplomatically calls India’s 
“history of working in isolation” (p. 172).
If, as one Australian scholar asserts, “the 
great game in the Indian Ocean is still 
in its early phases,” it will be increas-
ingly important for the United States to 
understand the Indian Ocean region and 
its residents (p. 232). Students and spe-
cialists will find India and China at Sea a 
succinct and well-crafted overview of the 
disparate voices influencing maritime 
competition in this vital ocean region.
DALE C. RIELAGE
To Master the Boundless Sea: The U.S. Navy, the 
Marine Environment, and the Cartography of 
Empire, by Jason W. Smith. Chapel Hill: Univ. 
of North Carolina Press, 2018. 280 pages. $35.
Scholars long have understood the 
power of the map. In To Master the 
Boundless Sea Jason W. Smith explains 
and explores the power of the nautical 
chart, masterfully weaving his observa-
tions into the history of the U.S. Navy. 
It is an exceptional work, strong in its 
scholarship, and boasting a compel-
ling—at times lyrical—narrative.
Smith’s book follows a chronological 
approach, culminating in the years 
following the Spanish-American 
War—the presumed height of the 
American empire; more-modern 
hydrographic activities are mentioned 
only in passing. Major themes include 
the interrelationship between com-
merce and the Navy, bureaucratic 
rivalries within the Navy and with 
other government agencies, the 
linkages between hydrography and U.S. 
imperialism, and the evolution of the 
nautical chart into a weapon of war.
To some degree, hydrography would 
seem to be—and is—a natural adjunct 
to the naval service. No environment is 
more dangerous to mariners than coastal 
and shallow waters; accurate charts are 
a necessity to avoid deadly groundings. 
Shallow-water craft, whether engaged 
in smuggling or combat operations, 
if provided with accurate depth and 
current information, can bedevil larger 
foes who lack that local knowledge. 
A chart—an accurate one—makes 
this knowledge exportable. However, 
such knowledge does not come eas-
ily; Smith details the painstaking and 
backbreaking repetitive work, usually 
conducted by sailors and junior officers, 
needed to gather these data. This 
was work for engineers, not poets.
However, as Smith notes, hydrography—
as part of the larger science of oceanog-
raphy—always has involved more than 
engineering. At least in its early stages, 
understanding the coastlines of distant 
shores also involved understanding 
the nature of the peoples who lived on 
those shores. This required abilities and 
skills associated with anthropologists; 
linguists; and, when these meetings 
became confrontations, military officers. 
The dangers of early hydrographic work 
were considerable, sometimes deadly.
Smith also highlights tensions 
between naval hydrographers and 
the wider community of scientists. 
Naval officers were then and are now 
essentially pragmatists. They do not lack 
for curiosity or imagination, but they 
energize those traits for the attainment 
of a practical objective, such as a 
knowledge of safe passages or the best 
sailing directions. While a generaliza-
tion, it can be asserted that mariners, 
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